minorities rarely impede his adopting "a reasoned approach to Constitutional problem-solving." In his address to the Conference on World Peace Through Law, he noted that the legitimacy of the judicial process is grounded in the tradition that "unlike the other branches of government, judges are required to give reasons for their decisions and to justify those decisions by reference to some broader principle." 4 Yet, for Thurgood Marshall, ultimately in those cases where Constitution or statute does not clearly decide the case, the judge perforce makes a value judgment, deciding according to his own intellect, experience and conscience. For him the complex phenomenon which lawyers know as law is an always unfinished product. It may be compared to a tapestry the weaving of which is never done, which repeats many of the patterns of the past but which constantly adds new patterns and variations of old patterns.
However, we must keep in mind that although the words of the Constitution are binding, their application to specific problems rarely has been easy. The founding fathers knew better than to pin down their descendants too closely. They sought to write down enduring principles rather than petty details. Thus it is that the Constitution does not take the form of a litany of specifics. There are therefore very few cases in which the constitutional answers are clear, all one way or all the other. Particularly difficult are the cases that raise conflicts between the individual and governmental power -the area which has particularly felt the impact of Thurgood Marshall's advocacy, and which today primarily absorbs the Court's attention. The conflicts of competing interests in these cases account for the great bulk of today's cases and controversies. This proves over and over again that, in a real sense, the calendar of the Supreme Court at any time is a fairly reliable mirror of the issues with which our society is struggling. Certainly we may expect not lesser but greater implication of the various constitutional guarantees designed to protect individual freedom from repressive governmental action, federal and state. Of course, the federal system's diffusion of governmental power has the purpose of securing individual freedom. But this is not all the Constitution provides to secure that end. There are also explicit provisions to prevent government, state or federal, from frustrating the great design. It is basic to our way of life that the ultimate protection of individual freedom is found in judicial enforcement of these constitutional guarantees. The reapportionment cases are a good illustration. Freedom of a state's citizens to experiment with their own economic and social programs is hardly meaningful if the political processes by which such programs must be achieved are controlled by only some of the people. The ideal is government of all the people, by all the people, and for all the people.
Similarly, decisions in the gender and racial discrimination cases have applied the equal protection clause to prevent states from discriminating against citizens on the basis of their sex or the color of their skins. Equal protection of the laws means equal protection today, whatever else the phrase may have meant in other times. Judges simply cannot escape their responsibility for the ultimate definition and application of that constitutional guarantee. In the same area of responsibility falls, I suggest, the series of decisions extending many of the guarantees of the first eight amendments to the states. The Bill of Rights is the primary source of expressed information as to what is meant by constitutional liberty. Its safeguards secure the climate which the law of freedom needs in order to exist. It is true that the first ten amendments were added to the Constitution to operate solely against federal power. But the fourteenth amendment was added in 1868 in response to a demand for national protection against abuses of state power, and it has been the channel for extending the protection of the safeguards of the Bill of Rights against the states.
The common thread of these holdings -most arrived at after Thurgood Marshall had helped so prodigiously to awaken the Court to the reality that the protections were honored not by their enforcement but by their neglect -had been the conclusion that the enforcement of the constitutional guarantees is essential to the preservation and furtherance of our free society. Some of these decisions have indeed aroused concern, particularly those that affect the processes of state criminal prosecutions. It cannot be denied that some decisions do restrict the latitude of choice open to the states in this area. But that is a price which must be paid for guarantees deemed to have a place among those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. The genius of the Constitution resides not in any static meaning that it had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs.
We have learned that what our constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be their measure to the vision of our time. Our descendants will learn that what those fundamentals mean for us cannot be the measure to the vision of their time. The constant for Americans, for our ancestors, for ourselves, and we hope for future generations, is our commitment to the constitutional ideal of [VOL. 40 libertarian dignity protected through law. Crises in prospect are creating, and will create, more and more threats to the achievement of that ideal -more and more collisions of the individual with his government. The need for judicial vigilance in the service of that ideal will not lessen. It will remain the business of judges to protect fundamental constitutional rights which will be threatened in ways not possibly envisoned by the Framers. Justices yet to sit, like their predecessors, are destined to labor earnestly in that endeavor -we hope with wisdom -to reconcile the complex realities of their times with the principles which mark a free people. As the nation moves ever forward towards its goals of liberty and freedom, and as new and different constitutional stresses and strains emerge, the role of the courts will be ever the same -to justify, I repeat, Madison's faith that "independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of constitutional rights."
5 Judges, like other human beings responsible for other human institutions, are of course on the dubious waves of error tossed. Yet, as has been said, the soul of a government of laws is the judicial function, and that function can only exist if adjudication is understood by our people to be, as it is, the essentially disinterested, rational and deliberate element of our society.
This library houses Thurgood Marshall's monumental contributions to the jurisprudence that has breathed new life into the constitutional protections for all individuals, including the disadvantaged, the poor, the oppressed minorities. That contribution is embedded in decisions of cases in which he prevailed as advocate and in decisions of cases in which his role was that of judge and justice.
As advocate, he argued alone in the Supreme Court for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund the fourteen trail-blazing cases that started this nation on the road to the end of racial discrimination. He was on the prevailing side in all but three of those cases. He also participated on the brief in another fourteen significant racial discrimination cases whose decisions reinforced the same progress to that end.
I so well remember that my former colleagues, Hugo Black and Felix Frankfurter, who did not often agree, were in complete agreement that the submissions of Thurgood Marshall as advocate were among the best presented to the Court in their time.
As Solicitor General of the United States Thurgood Marshall personally argued eighteen cases and prevailed in fourteen. The range of issues was extraordinarily wide and his success again attested to his high skill in advocacy. The high quality of his advocacy richly earned 5. 1 CONG. DEB. 439 (1834) .
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him his reputation as one of the great advocates in the history of the Court.
Only recently I read this: because of the sensitive and skilled way that Thurgood Marshall structured the desegregation litigation it is now clear that the school desegregation cases have had a very great influence on the manner in which American courts perform their task. Consequently, this impact will significantly affect the future ability of other Americans to find the same protection in the law that Brown provided for this now-famous nine-year-old girl from Topeka, Kansas. My most abiding memory of Thurgood on this court was his ability to infuse his judicial product with the elements of the advocate's craft. As an attorney Thurgood stressed "the human side" of the case. As a judge he wrote for the people. (And would not we all be enriched if more judges exhibited this concern for the consumer?) He possessed an instinct for the critical fact, the gut issue, born of his exquisite sense of the practical. This gift was often cloaked in a witty aside: "There's a very practical way to find out whether a confession has been coerced: ask, how big was the cop?" But behind this jovial veneer is a precise and brilliant legal tactician who, to quote his 1966 Law Day speech in Miami, was able "to shake free of the 19th century moorings and view the law not as a set of abstract and socially unrelated commands of the sovereign, but as an effective instrument of social policy." Thurgood was able to sear the nation's conscience and move hearts formerly strangled by hoary intransigence. And, because of him, we are all more free.
7
And I can personally attest that, as has been said, on the Supreme Court Marshall seems to be consciously attempting to assist his brethren in understanding those facets of American life upon which their decisions impact but about which some have little first hand knowledge. It may be easy for some people to think that weekly savings of less than $2 are no burden. But no one who has had close contact with poor people can fail to understand how close to the margin of survival many of them are. A sudden illness, for example, may destroy whatever savings they may have accumulated, and by eliminating a sense of security may destroy the incentive to save in the future. A pack or two of cigarettes may be, for them, not a routine purchase but a luxury indulged in only rarely. The desperately poor almost never go to see a movie, which the majority seems to believe is an almost weekly activity. They have more important things to do with what little money they have -like attempting to provide some comforts for a gravely ill child, as Kras must do.
It is perfectly proper for judges to disagree about what the Constitution requires. But it is disgraceful for an interpretation of the Constitution to be premised upon unfounded assumptions about how people live. Marshall remains very much the same person he was as a litigator. He retains an ability to gauge instinctively the pragmatic limits of judicial power. He insists that constitutional doctrine be based on reality. This daily insistence on attention to the basics of constitutional litigation makes him a model for those who now bring to the courts the causes of the unborn, the physically handicapped, the mentally ill and others for whom sterile constitutional analysis of the plessy variety remains a formidable barrier.
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If his judicial philosophy insists that law be gauged to current realities confronting people, it is also a response to the lessons of the past.
The university and the law school truly honor themselves in dedicating this magnificent library in honor of a great American. 2 had not yet been decided, so the case was being tried under the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson? Marshall soon convinced me that Southern University was not only separate from, but also unequal to, L.S.U. Law School. I crossed the Rubicon when I decided that case.
I vividly remember Marshall's cross-examination of one of the deans of Southern Law School. Earlier in the trial, counsel for the State had emphasized that Southern Law School, unlike L.S.U. Law School, was air-conditioned, clearly an advantage in sultry Louisiana. Marshall asked the Dean to describe in detail the building in which Southern was housed. The Dean testified that it was a large wooden frame structure with five floors housing several parts of the University, and that the Law School was on the fifth floor. Marshall then asked the witness to describe what was on each of the other floors, which he did. Marshall then asked the witness whether each of the first four floors was air-conditioned like the fifth. The answer as to each floor was "No." Feigning surprise at the Dean's answers, Marshall then asked the witness what was immediately above the fifth floor. His answer: "The roof." Marshall then suggested to the Dean that the Law School was really housed in the attic of the building. The Dean readily agreed, saying, "That's why it is air-conditioned."
Marshall's cross-examination of the Southern Law School dean was typical of his courtroom performances: he was always straight-forward, good-humored, and incisive. During my years as a district judge, I encountered few lawyers as skilled in their craft. He had an uncanny ability to identify the crucial facts in a case, and to describe legal issues in clear, commonsense terms. And he was able to do this in a way that conveyed, often quite dramatically, the realities of segregation -how it affected the daily lives of black Americans. His efforts in the Law School case, as well as in the other cases he tried in my courtroom, helped persuade me that if the law did not prohibit racial discrimination, then the law was wrong. Two years after the Louisiana law school case the Supreme Court issued its historic decision in Brown v. Board of Education.
I was not the only judge who was introduced to the harsh realities of racism by Thurgood Marshall. As the NAACP's general counsel, he orchestrated the long campaign to end segregation in the schools. That campaign was brilliant, a masterpiece of litigation strategy. Beginning with an attack on segregation in professional schools, then moving on to confront segregation in elementary schools, Marshall carefully laid the foundation for reversal of Plessy v. Ferguson. Apparently tireless, he traveled among dozens of states, discussing tactics with local lawyers, encouraging frightened parents, trying cases. Marshall lost many of these preliminary skirmishes. But, ultimately, he won the war. As counsel in Brown v. Board of Education, he convinced the Supreme Court that "separate but equal" could never really be equal, and that segregated education must end.
The significance of Marshall's victory in Brown v. Board of Education cannot be overstated. As a matter of constitutional law, Brown may be the most important decision of our time. It breathed new life into the equal protection clause, and demonstrated to lawyers and judges that the law could be a powerful tool for social reform. But by helping to secure a victory in Brown, Marshall did more than contribute to the development of constitutional jurisprudence. The message of Brown, that segregation of public institutions must end, affected the lives of all Americans. We were reminded that our nation had its origin in a commitment to individual equality. And we learned that, because of that commitment, racism would no longer be tolerated. It is true that some have been less receptive to this lesson than others; discrimination continues to flourish. But after Brown, even diehard segregationists must realize thay are battling against the force of law.
The list of Thurgood Marshall's achievements does not end with his victory in Brown. It is difficult to imagine a more spectacular legal career. After Brown was decided, Marshall spent several years fighting to ensure that its mandate was enforced. In 1961 he was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Later, he became Solicitor General under President Johnson. Finally, in 1967, he moved to the Supreme Court. Throughout, he has remained firm in his belief that the law, used effectively, can achieve a more just society.
If, as I have always believed, one measure of a judge's work is his compassion, then Thurgood Marshall is a great judge. His judicial product reflects not only a fine legal mind, but the same sensitivity to human needs and social realities that characterized his work for the NAACP. He is a steadfast opponent of legal abstractions that fail to recognize the facts of life: that the poor really do live on the brink of financial disaster, that the poor as defendants in criminal cases do not receive equal justice with the rich, that minorities really do lack power, that, considering the influence of money in the political process, the one man-one vote principle on which this democracy was founded is a pious fraud. Because he is only one of nine Justices, and because he wants to push the law further than some of the other Justices would like it to go, he often speaks in concurrence or dissent. Even so, his insistence that the Court consider the real impact of its decisions has had a powerful and beneficial impact on the work of that institution.
Thurgood Marshall, as much as any man of our time, has served the nation. Throughout his career, as a lawyer and as a judge, he has acted to ensure that law serves the ends of justice and goodness. I am certain he would say that he has not been as successful as he would like. But the fact remains that he has achieved at least a large part of what he set out to achieve. As a result, he has helped make our society a better, more decent, place in which to live. A little over twenty-five years ago I made the familiar high school trip to Washington, D.C. My classmates and I took in all the monuments. We even managed to catch a few minutes of the Supreme Court in session. We entered in the middle of an oral argument, and though we did not fully understand what was transpiring in the courtroom, no one could miss the sense of drama. A tall black lawyer was addressing the Court, and all eyes -set in a sea of white -were fixed on him.
The lawyer spoke with a very special eloquence. He was dignified and proper, but his words were accessible to all. The formalisms that so often mask the law and make it forbidding were gone. The case was put in simple, clear, powerful words. These words were uttered with patience, with a steel, almost icy serenity, yet beneath them was an urgency, a longing, that could not help but move the Justices and the audience. The moment was electrifying -it infused me with a spirit and determination that helped shape my life, it captured the nation. Afterward I learned that the case was called Brown v. Board of Education and the lawyer Thurgood Marshall.
A decade later we met again, this time on a somewhat more direct basis. The lawyer had recently become a judge, of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and I became his law clerk. I was given a chance that was both extraordinary and risky, to work for a hero of my youth -though, until now, I never dared to tell him how much he meant to me. He is not that kind of person -he is open, always joking, and warm, but with little tolerance for explicit displays of sentiment ("knucklehead" is his favorite word of endearment).
The qualities I saw in the courtroom in the 1950s filled his chambers in the 1960s, and there was more. There were his storiesthat conveyed to me the terror, the sacrifice, and, once in a while, even the joy of being a civil rights lawyer in the 1930s and 1940s, still a time of the most crude and brutal racism. There were the daring moments on the bench -when he "overruled" some Supreme Court precedents, those, he said, of an earlier age and likely to be repudiated by the * Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES LAW REVIEW, 1978. Adopted by permis-Supreme Court itself whenever it got around to the task;' or when he questioned a decision of an even higher authority for the Second Circuit -L. Hand. 2 There were also our disagreements over the casesextraordinary arguments, in which his vision of the Constitution and my recently acquired education at the Harvard Law School -a place then consumed by Wechsler's "neutral principles" -did not exactly mesh. In time I learned, I learned a lot, about the law and about him.
Thurgood Marshall has probably had the most stunning legal career of the twentieth century -the lawyer in Brown, a turning point in American jurisprudence; a judge of the Second Circuit; later the Solicitor General of the United States; and still later a Supreme Court justice. Clearly he was on the side of history (though that was not apparent to all -his grandmother greeted his decision to study law with an insistence that he learn to cook, so that he could be sure of a job). But there was a cause more personal to the man, a vision of American society that sees law as the central instrument of reform and protection of human rights as the highest purpose of the Constitution. This was the vision that led him to the NAACP and sustained him through the harassment and defeats of his career. This was the vision that found expression in his work as a civil rights lawyer and also as a judge.
Thurgood Marshall's commitment to that vision was not shared by all his colleagues on the Second Circuit. Now and then a civil rights case came before that court in the 1964-65 term, the year of my clerkship, and the judge took his stand -in dissent.
3 A more frequent and Escobedo v. Illinois 7 (the stepping stone to Miranda v. Arizona).8 Some of the judges on the Second Circuit, particularly those in positions of leadership in the bar and the academy, received these decisions of the Warren Court only in the most grudging fashion. Thurgood Marshall, on the other hand, insisted that these decisions be taken at their full value -not in obedience to a higher authority, but because they embodied the right principles of our constitutional order. He took these stands repeatedly, and courageously, at some discomfort -was no fun for a new judge, one whose appointment took the Senate almost a year to confirm, one with no ties to Wall Street, then the spiritual center of the Second Circuit, repeatedly to raise his voice in protest, against the prominent, the established, the recognized. He spoke on behalf of the Supreme Court, true, but in the early 1960s that institution was at the center of controversy and criticism -it needed support and had little to confer. As it turned out, history was once again on Thurgood Marshall's side -he moved on to be Solicitor General at the end of the year, giving up the tenure of his judgeship because he too could not say "no" to LBJ.
Not long ago I took my daughters to Washington, D.C. We made a stop at the Supreme Court, and I introduced them to Thurgood Marshall, not in the courtroom, but now in his chambers. He was his usual jovial self, yet beneath the surface, beneath the joking and the stories (which were retold for my daughters), one could see the grandeur of the man who had stood in the courtroom twenty-five years ago, with that same sense of struggle and determination, now resisting the efforts of the Burger Court to undo many achievements of Brown and the Warren Court era. One could also see, and marvel at, his continued capacity and effort to recharge a new generation, even though the present state of the law could not have been for him a source of satisfaction or optimism -so much that he stands for is in jeopardy.
That is why it is so fitting to honor Thurgood Marshall at this time. Not because we are at another anniversary -he could not care less about things like that (it pained him to sit for the sculpture Baltimore in an incident that occurred in Georgia, at the instigation of the driver, when she refused to change her seat, despite the fact that the incident occurred on the bus of a connecting carrier). erected for him, and not simply because it is so near the one the city erected for its other justice, Taney). Rather, because we are at a time when there is a need to celebrate the personal qualities that Thurgood Marshall exemplifies -courage sustained by a vision of the centrality of human rights to our constitutional order. In honoring him we express the hope that his vision will once again be triumphant. We renew his spirit and ours, and thus do what we can to make certain that Thurgood Marshall will once again be on the side of history.
THURGOOD MARSHALL: LAWYER AND JUSTICE
Louis H. POLLAK*
I.
De Tocqueville's most celebrated observation about the role of law in the life of the new republic -that it was customary for American lawyers to bring great issues of public policy to court -was not a report of a new phenomenon: In 1734, long before Americans had become a nation, Philadelphia's Andrew Hamilton had journeyed to New York to conduct the successful defense of John Peter Zenger, printer-publisher of the New York Weekly Journal, against charges of seditious libel, and had thereby "first established in English and American law the freedom of the press."' By the mid-1830's, when de Tocqueville's great work was published, the process which had been tentative and sporadic in the eighteenth century was a major ingredient of the American system of government. 9. Able as he was, Webster may have been an iota less transcendent an advocate than he believed himself to be: After the decision in Gibbons v. Ogden, in which he and Attorney General William Wirt were victorious counsel, Webster observed that "The opinion of the Court, as rendered by the Chief Justice, was little else than a recital of my argument. The Chief Justice told me that he had little to do but to repeat that argument, as that covered the whole ground. And, which was a little curious, he never referred to the fact that Mr. Wirt had made an argument. He did not speak of it once. . . That was very singular. It was an accident, I think -Mr. Wirt was a great lawyer, and a great man. But sometimes a man gets a kink and doesn't hit right. That was one of the occasions. But that [VOL. 40 while not on a par with Webster -achieved a deserved public preeminence not accorded any other member of the bar. One was Clarence Darrow. The other was and is Thurgood Marshall.
The most significant of Clarence Darrow's extraordinary roster of cases was his defense of a Tennessee school teacher, John T. Scopes, against the charge that he had violated Tennessee law by teaching about evolution. The prosecution of Scopes, in the small town of Dayton They can't take race out of this case. From the day this case was filed until this moment, nobody has in any form or fashion, despite the fact I made it clear in the opening argument that I was relying on it, done anything to distinguish this statute from the Black Codes, which they must admit, because nobody can dispute, say anything anybody wants to say, one way or the other, the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to deprive the states of power to enforce Black Codes or anything else like it.
We charge that they are Black Codes. They obviously are Black Codes if you read them. They haven't denied that they are Black Codes, so if the Court wants to very narrowly decide this case, they can decide it on that point.
So whichever way it is done, the only way that this Court can decide this case in opposition to our position, is that there must be James F. Byrnes -former Senator, "Assistant President", Secretary of State, and Justice of the Supreme Court.
Richard Kluger, in Simple Justice, has described the closing minutes of Davis' 1953 reargument, which was to be his last appearance ever in the Supreme Court:
As he I Davis] neared the end of his argument, the drain on him became apparent to Chief Justice Warren, who looked down on the great old advocate from the distance of just a few feet. "Mr. Davis was quite emotional," Warren recalled later. "In fact, he seemed to me to break down a few times during the hearing." With deep conviction, Davis wound up pleading for the integrity of states' rights and the good intentions of his client. "Your honors do not sit, and cannot sit, as a glorified board of education for the state of South Carolina or any other state," he declared. South Carolina had not come before the Court "as Thad Stevens would have wished -in sack cloth and ashes ... .It is confident of its good faith and intention to produce equality for all of its children of whatever race or color," as it had done in equalizing the schools of Clarendon County. So much had been gained in race relations, he said, adding, I am reminded -and I hope it won't be treated as a reflection on anybody -of Aesop's fable of the dog and the meat: The dog, with a fine piece of meat in his mouth, crossed a bridge and saw [his] shadow in the stream and plunged in for it and lost both substance and shadow.
Here is equal education, not promised, not prophesied, but present. Shall it be thrown away on some fancied question of racial prestige? Thurgood Marshall remembered seeing tears on the cheeks of John W. Davis as he turned away from the Court for the final time in his life. Attorney General Lindsay Almond of Virginia, sitting at the counsel table with him, recalls that Davis was emotionally overwrought at the end. He had stated the South's case as effectively as it could be done. But his day was past. "He thought the case could be viewed as a strictly legal matter," reflects Robert Figg, who had argued Briggs in Charleston. "I don't think he ever realized the swirl of social and political events affecting it." R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 672-73 (1975 some reason which gives the state the right to make a classification that they can make in regard to nothing else in regard to Negroes, and we submit the only way to arrive at this decision is to find that for some reason Negroes are inferior to all other human beings.
Nobody will stand in the Court and urge that, and in order to arrive at the decision that they want us to arrive at, there would have to be some recognition of a reason why of all of the multitudinous groups of people in this country you have to single out Negroes and give them this separate treatment.
It can't be because of slavery in the past, because there are very few groups in this country that haven't had slavery some place back in the history of their groups. It can't be color because there are Negroes as white as the drifted snow, with blue eyes, and they are just as segregated as the colored man.
The only thing can be is an inherent determination that the people who were formerly in slavery, regardless of anything else, shall be kept as near that stage as is possible, and now is the time, we submit, that this Court should make it clear that this is not what our Constitution stands for.' 4 Agreeing, the Court restored the nation's -and the world's -faith in the sanctity and supremacy of the principles of equality and liberty protected by the Constitution.
II.
Of the handful of larger-than-life courtroom lawyers from Webster onward, only Thurgood Marshall has become a Justice of the Supreme Court. As a Justice, he has been no less vigilant than as a lawyer in policing assertions of state interest that appear to be in tension with the national liberties enshrined in the Constitution. Not infrequently, a majority of the Court has found a saving measure of legitimacy in state policies which are for Justice Marshall masks for unredeemed parochialism. And occasionally (occasions which the Justice has been quick to identify) there has been substantial state court precedent -sometimes rooted in state constitutions as well as, or in lieu of, the federal Constitution -for Justice Marshall's dissenting view of the constraints constitutional norms put on state policy. Such was the case in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez, where the majority of the Court found no constitutional infirmity in "substantial interdistrict disparities in [Texas public] school expenditures," which disparities were chiefly a function of large variations in the property-tax base from In the litigation now before the Court, the Supreme Court of California construed the California Constitution to protect precisely those rights of communication and expression that were at stake in Logan Valley, Lloyd, and Hudgens. The California court concluded that its state "constitution broadly proclaims speech and petition rights. Shopping centers to which the public is invited can provide an essential and invaluable forum for exercising those rights." 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860, 592 P.2d 341, 347 (1979 Lawyer Marshall restored the supremacy and integrity of the democratic principles which are at the core of the federal Constitution. Justice Marshall has labored long and effectively to strengthen these principles. In the face of occasional setbacks, Justice Marshall has recognized that a proper line of retreat may lead to terrain he would not in his lawyer years have expected to find hospitable -the constitutions of the several states.
2 ' It is a recognition that attests to the vision and enterprise of the Justice -and to the health of our federalism. Rev. 489 (1977) ," Justice Marshall's awareness of broader constitutional terrain than that his own Court patrols draws, as it should, on the comparable insights of Justice Brennan, who is on so many issues Justice Marshall's strong partner in constitutional principle.
22. The salutary renascence of state constitutional law derives from the increasingly widespread recognition by state courts that they occupy a genuinely dual role: (1) all state courts are obliged -by the supremacy clause and as surrogates of the United States Supreme Court -to enforce the guarantees contained in the federal Constitution and federal statutes; (2) each state court system is the principal and ultimate architect and custodian of that state's own homegrown constitutional jurisprudence. Responsible exercise by a state court of that dual responsibility has methodological implications which have been thoughtfully explicated in recent opinions of the Oregon Supreme Court. See, e.g., Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123 (1981); State v. Scharf, 605 P.2d 690 (1980) . Justice Linde of that court has put the matter well:
The proper sequence is to analyze the state's law, including its constitutional law, before reaching a federal constitutional claim. This is required, not for the sake either of parochialism or of style, but because the state does not deny any right claimed under the federal constitution when the claim before the court is fully met by state law. Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 126.
Pursuit of the analytic sequence described by Justice Linde is proper not only because a state constitutional guarantee closely comparable in wording to a federal constitutional guarantee may be accorded a different (and broader) We all have some idea of the qualities a great judge has: wisdom, a sense of what is proper in the circumstances, an ability to explain how the law as it is supports a just result. When we think about great lawyers, though, the image is much more blurred. Wisdom and judgment matter, of course, but the lawyer's audience is narrower than the judge's, and so ability to communicate may be a less important quality of greatness in lawyers. Then too lawyers must directly conciliate, and the ability to persuade an adversary that a dispute should be settled on favorable terms, though it shares something with the ability to write a persuasive opinion, invokes skills that may not readily be captured on paper. Yet to make the ability to persuade one's adversaries a crucial element of greatness in lawyering would consign those whose adversaries are rigid in their positions to the second rank.
Thurgood Marshall was a great lawyer. His considerable courtroom skills, though they were not irrelevant to his greatness, were secondary. Those who know him understand his wisdom, the superb quality of his judgments about life and law. As general counsel in the NAACP's campaign against school segregation, he assembled a staff and a "kitchen cabinet" which presented him with the ingenious and innovative arguments that the litigation needed. Marshall then selected, almost always correctly and without hesitation, the set of arguments that would work best. But Marshall had another quality that contributed to -indeed, may have been the prerequisite to -his greatness.
He was a great politician. Faced with conflicting demands from disparate elements in his constituency, Marshall was able to unite the constituency behind a program with which many had initially disagreed.
Marshall used his political skills with great effect between 1945 and 1950 in the struggle against school segregation. 1 Prior to 1945 the NAACP had been involved in two kinds of cases. Some sought to desegregate Southern graduate and professional schools. Others sought to equalize the salaries of black and white teachers. With but a few exceptions, the NAACP had not been involved in efforts to desegregate elementary or secondary schools. Yet if segregation was to be destroyed -and that was always the NAACP's goal -something had to be done about its foundations in the early education of Southern children. The NAACP could pursue either of two paths. Without directly challenging the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 2 the NAACP could seek to equalize the expenditures on black and white schools. Or it could mount a direct attack on Plessy, seeking to force Southern school boards to educate black and white children in the same classrooms. Both paths led, it was hoped, to the same end, for the NAACP lawyers believed that. equalization would be so costly as to make segregation a fiscally intolerable policy. But important strategic consequences flowed from the choice between equalization and the direct attack. Between 1945 and 1950 Marshall, with great political skill, laid the groundwork within the NAACP for the direct attack.
The issue of dealing with elementary and secondary schools did not come into focus until the mid-1940's, though the NAACP had been litigating desegregation cases since the mid-1930's. The reasons lie in the manner in which the NAACP had succeeded with its early cases. In late 1946 Robert Carter, a staff attorney, drafted a speech for Walter White, the NAACP's executive secretary, in which he suggested that White say, "The teachers' salary fight is now about over." 3 Equalization had occurred in many of the South's larger cities. But Southern school boards had developed strategies of evasion that were likely to be difficult to overcome. 4 Even where blatantly discriminatory salary schedules remained in effect, the localities were likely to be small, and the return on the NAACP's efforts would probably not have warranted a county-by-county mopping up operation. By 1945, then, a new direction for litigation below the university level had to be found if the NAACP was to sustain its pressure on segregated education on every level. But that direction could have been towards equalization of facilities or towards desegregation directly.
The national staff was reluctant to pursue an equalization strategy for both ideological and organizational reasons. The former were developed in detail in a series of increasingly bitter letters between Marshall and Carter Wesley. Wesley was an attorney and editor of an important black newspaper published in Houston. He was described as militant and as having strong will power and, as the exchange with Marshall makes clear, Wesley was not an easy person to get along with. The dispute in 1946 and 1947 over desegregation strategy revived an earlier one over strategy in challenging the Texas white primary; in [VOL. 40 both, Wesley was concerned with questions of control by the national office as well as with questions of strategy.
5 In 1946, Wesley set up the Texas Conference for the Equalization of Educational Opportunities. The Conference, which may well have existed almost exclusively on paper, was said to be concerned with "prosecution of such cases as do not come within the NAACP's non-segregation field.", 6 That is, it was to fight "on the segregated side" for equal though separate facilities. Marshall expressed concern that if the Conference did not necessarily duplicate the NAACP's efforts, it would "work . . . toward the establishment of segregated educational facilities" and therefore "compet[e] with the principles of the N.A.A.C.P." ' 7 He said, "You just simply cannot have a little segregation; you cannot rationalize on the necessity of segregation at all." ' Marshall concluded:
Every segregated elementary school, every segregated high school and every segregated college unit is a monument to the perpetuation of segregation. It is one thing to "take" segregation that is forced upon you and it is another thing to ask for segregation. I still believe that if the opposition finds that there are representative and respectable Negroes who cannot be bought and who have standing, who are in favor of segregation, then they will consider that as a much better victory than any legal case that they can win against US.
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Wesley presented his case in a long letter of October 8, 1947. He agreed that direct attacks on segregation were appropriate, but objected to "making this an exclusive remedy."' Instead, equalization suits should be brought; it did not "invite the establishment of segregated schools.., to insist that those schools already established be equalized."" To Wesley, "the NAACP is fooling itself" in thinking that a direct attack will "knock down segregation at one fell swoop." 12 Instead a series of cases would be needed. Wesley pointed to the salary equalization cases as models, and thought that Marshall could not simultaneously support those cases and attack facilities equalization suits. Wesley found no inconsistency between direct attacks in university cases and equalization suits elsewhere. The latter simply accepted the existing fact of segregation, without adopting it as a principle, and sought to make "separate but equal" a reality. He concluded by noting that the university suits had resulted, not in desegregation of existing facilities, but in creating "shameful makeshift" 13 separate programs, with no real equality. If such farces were to be avoided, equalization suits had to be brought.
In Mt. Pleasant, Texas the whites are taking most of the money and giving Negroes makeshifts in the form of inadequate buildings, short school terms, no bus service, and no lunches. You know as well as I that you aren't going to get a Negro with nerve enough, in that mean East, Texas town, to sue to have his child go to a white school. But you will get plaintiffs to sue to make their school equal, because that follows the pattern that the white man himself has set up.
1 4
Marshall's response came a week later: NAACP suits in elementary and secondary cases point "out the inequalities" and seek an order that would bar the school board from "denying to the Negro the equal facilities furnished to the white student."' 5 He contrasted Wesley's procedure as seeking a different form of relief, "the establishment of equal facilities by raising the Negro school to the level of the white school . ..."16
Our prayer for relief is to enjoin the Board from discriminating, which would be answered, it seems to me, by either the admission to the white school or the type of relief you request in your case. Under these circumstances, is it not true that in our proceedings we get either the type of relief in your case or the breaking down of segregation and that in this type of case it is impossible to get less 12. Id.
Id.
14. 
[VOL. 40 than we can get in your case, and at the same time, we would be constantly hitting at segregation. If you agree with this, it seems to me that we are then at the place where the only point of dispute on this type of action is a difference in opinion as to procedure.'" He acknowledged that there had been changes in the NAACP's approach, a result of "a carefully worked out legal attack which we have been working on for several years; . . . a realization that the procedure formerly followed was not gaining the results we expected; and most important, the terrific support for an all-out attack on segregation through the people in Texas . . . ."1 The salary cases were not a precedent for Wesley's approach, for there the issue was "not the school but the race of the teacher," an issue applicable to mixed as well as segregated systems.
19
Marshall's position, then, was that relief in the form of equalization of facilities was subsumed under the request for an end to discrimination, and would be acceptable as a fall-back position. But he rejected equalization as the sole form of relief to be sought, because that would implicitly accept the position that segregated schools were legally tolerable and could be made equal in fact. Marshall seems to have had the better of the argument, and indeed it was later said that the basic desegregation cases were developed in ways that "left all options open," and that "some of these cases look suspiciously akin to the old equality approach with the direct challenge thrown in." But it was not just the contest with Wesley for leadership in the black community that led Marshall to tell the Texas Conference of Branches of the NAACP that lilt no longer takes courage to fight for mere equality in a separate school system," 2° and that the NAACP would not seek to enforce segregation statutes.
2 1 The reality of the litigation process meant that the difference between equalization and the direct attack could not be blurred once the cases moved past the stage of pleading, and it was certain that, given a choice, school boards would equalize rather than desegregate.
These ideological concerns were augmented by organizational factors. Investigating inequalities, especially in systems where black 17 schools might be as good as white ones in some respects -for example, by having been constructed more recently -but worse in others -for example, in lacking laboratory facilities -was likely to be timeconsuming. The salary equalization cases had shown how serious a drain on the NAACP's limited resources could be occasioned by drawn out, heavily factual cases, and how difficult it was to use one fact-laden case as a lever in securing victories in other cases. Marshall explored these problems by arranging to pay a young Virginia lawyer, Spottswood Robinson, for a one-year effort to establish a litigation program for elementary and secondary schools. Most of Robinson's effort was devoted to "getting things lined up for court action" by investigating, petitioning school boards for general relief, and applying for admission to white schools. When the year ended Robinson had explored the situation in seventy-two districts, and had "active" cases at some stage in thirtyeight. But by October 1950, three years after the program began, Robinson reported that only three of fifty-one active cases were in court. The reasons were obvious: as Robinson reported to Marshall in a memorandum apparently solicited as part of Marshall's effort to persuade doubters that the direct attack was preferable to equalization litigation, the cost of a single equalization case in which only two schools were compared was $5,000. Investigation required substantial investments of attorney time and, as Robert Carter pointed out, while equalization cases had to proceed school district by school district, the direct attack would require only a single case for each jurisdiction. If, as Marshall desired, a concentrated attack leading to real progress was to occur, it would have to take the form of a direct attack; the NAACP lacked the resources for any other course.
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The national staff had been expanded, but this, instead of making more attorneys available for the time-consuming equalization cases, actually increased the pressures for the direct attack. The staff at first consisted of Charles Hamilton Houston and Marshall. Houston resigned as Special Counsel in 1939 and became the most important member in a sort of "shadow" staff which conducted occasional investigations and litigation. Typically Marshall supervised the investigation and did the litigation himself. As he had before 1939, Marshall continued to handle most of the salary equalization cases after he succeeded Houston in that year. But for some time after 1939 Houston, though not formally on the NAACP staff, litigated a number of important graduate school challenges. By the mid 1940's Houston's direct contributions to litigation had substantially diminished, but his place was taken by a number of salaried staff lawyers. The expansion of the staff, which included at various times Milton Konvitz, Edward Dudley, Robert Carter, Marian Wynn Perry, Franklin Williams, and Constance Baker Motley, allowed Marshall to claim that "we are now in a position to broaden out our legal program." The new attorneys, though, were all young Northerners, inclined to favor the direct attack because of enthusiasm and problems in appreciating fully the difficulties faced by blacks in the South. Some of their impatience can be glimpsed in a memorandum Carter wrote to Marshall in April 1948 after he had conferred with Robinson in Virginia. Carter said that the only problem was "the old [one] as to whether or not an all-out attack on segregation will be made or whether counsel will be satisfied with a settlement which provides -for steps toward equalization." He had told Robinson that a settlement giving the schools time to equalize was probably inevitable; there were not enough resources to pursue a direct attack. But he questioned the typical request for relief, an order prohibiting further discrimination.
What this ultimately means is that a step by the school board to equalize the educational opportunities for Negroes in a separate school will normally be considered by the court as satisfaction of its order. I do not believe, nor does Spotts, that we can be parties to a consent to give the school board time to equalize. Our petition must be that they are under an obligation to equalize instantly. However, you realize, of course, that unless you attack these cases on the ground that segregation itself is unlawful -and unless you refuse to accept any settlement short of that -you are taking steps in these cases which . . . are short of the goals which you have set ... . This has caused some confusion on Spotts part, but as I stated above, my own feeling was that we do not have sufficient funds to make the all-out attack on the elementary and high school level.
Hence, I think Spotts must be left to use his own discretion as to what compromise he will accept from the school board. I would hate, however, to have anybody other than Spotts have this much discretion. You and the national office will have to do some very careful thinking on this proposition by the time you hold your general education conference in order that there can be some clear-cut, well-defined policy in this regard. Though the pressures to attack segregation directly were strong, they were partially offset by others. One was a diffuse sense that the direct attack was premature; the NAACP had not, after all, secured a major school decision from the Supreme Court since the Gaines case in 1938.24 More important, black teachers and principals, who had provided major support for the litigation until then, were extremely nervous about the direct attack strategy. Their sense of Southern mores and some painful experiences had shown them that the jobs of all black teachers, not just those of a few who took active part in litigation, were threatened by the direct attack. They knew that Southern whites would not tolerate a situation in which black teachers, especially men, taught white children, especially girls. The threats did not materialize until after the decision to pursue the direct attack was made, but by the end of 1951 it was clear that these fears were "one of the greatest factors contributing to opposition to integrating the public schools" within the black community. In 1953, the superintendent of the Topeka schools refused to renew the contract of a black teacher, because the Board believed that "the majority of people in Topeka will not want to employ negro teachers next year for white children." Earlier a branch member whose wife was a teacher expressed concern that "in Kansas when such cases are brought for integration of students . . . the Negro Teachers are cut adrift without any consideration., 25 The most extensive discussions of threats to the jobs of black teachers came in connection with a decision by white authorities to close the black Louisville Municipal College when desegregation was ordered in 1951. Many black teachers would be fired. The NAACP took a "very avid interest" in the situation, because "we cannot hope to secure the full-hearted support of the teaching faculty of Negro institutions in our fight against segregation in educaion if the successful results of such a fight will be the loss of jobs." The staff tried to allay fears by pointing to experiences in New Jersey and Indiana, where no wholesale firings occurred, and by developing legal strategies to challenge as discriminatory the firing of black teachers in the course of desegregation. Dean Charles Thompson of the Howard School of Education argued that there would be no "wholesale dismissal" because there were not enough white teachers to serve the combined school populations and because residential segregation would permit the continued employment of black teachers in black neighborhood schools. But those associated with the 24. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). Marshall and Carter (Dec. 18, 1951) campaign knew that remedies after dismissal were, in a practical sense, of limited value, and that the threat of dismissal would be realized in some places. Dean Thompson concluded that black teachers should accept the sacrifices entailed by desegregation: "the elimination of legally-enforced segregated schools should out-weigh in importance the loss of teaching positions even by a majority of the 75,000 Negro teachers who might conceivably be affected.
June Shagaloff to
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That response was available, though, only after the decision had been made to seek desegregation rather than equalization. Because black teachers as a class were not threatened with loss of jobs until that decision was made, there is little indication in the documents that actual threats affected the NAACP's decisions. But the members' knowledge of the white South and the staff's understanding of the role of black teachers in providing community leadership in the campaign to that point made it inevitable that these problems would weigh heavily against a direct attack decision.
2 7 Marshall sometimes advocated a "leave it to the defendants" strategy. But the same sophistication of members and staff led them to understand that such a strategy was only a fig-leaf for an underlying decision in favor of the equalization approach.
These countervailing pressures could have resulted in organizational paralysis. It is true that the choice between equalization and direct attack was postponed from 1945, when the issue surfaced, to 1950. But the period was not one of paralysis. Rather, it gave Marshall the time to use his skills with as much brilliance as the entire campaign saw. He combined a consistent rhetorical commitment to the direct attack with a conscious strategy of temporizing. The delays were used to prepare the organization for the direct attack decision that Marshall preferred all along.
In late 1945, Marshall expressed concern to Walter White about ''our inability to get cases started on the equalization of educational opportunities in the South. 28 The lawyers were available, the cases were important, and they were easy to win. He suggested that a 26. Carter to George Wilson et al. (Jan. 8, 1951) , 1954-1964 (1967) (Ph.D. dissertation, Ball State University, (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) .
27. For a hint, see Nabrit, supra note 9, at 467 (noting "a considerable difference of opinion" about the merits of the choice).
28. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Walter White (Oct. 24, 1945) (Box 110, Legal Files, supra note 3).
planning conference be held. 29 The lawyers met in Atlanta in late April 1946, for an informal review of procedures. Although much of the discussion focussed on the university cases, it did explore the general theoretical problems entailed by seeking a general injunction rather than the elimination of specific inequalities. 30 By the end of the year Marshall was able to write Carl Murphy, publisher of the Baltimore Afro-American, a letter that combined support for the direct attack with reasons for delay: "Frankly, and confidentially, and just between the two of us, there is serious doubt in the minds of most of us as to the timing of an all-out attack on segregation per se in the present United States Supreme Court. We are now working on the problem of having a complete study made of the evil of segregation to demonstrate that there is no such thing as 'separate but equal' in any governmental agency ... .When this is complete, it might then be possible to make an all-out attack. However I do not know how long it will take to complete this study . . .. ,, The letter shows how Marshall dealt with pressure for the direct attack.
A long memorandum from Marshall to Roy Wilkins in 1947 demonstrates Marshall's personal commitment to the direct attack, and shows that his hesitancy served the purpose of balancing pressures within the NAACP:
I had assumed that the NAACP really meant business about an all-out attack against segregation, especially in the public school system. I had assumed that we not only realized that segregation was an evil but had come to the conclusion that nothing can be gained under the doctrine of "separate but equal." I had assumed that the Board of Directors, as well as the branches and branch officers, were in agreement on this. I had assumed that the resolutions adopted at the Annual Conference and the beautiful statements made at Board and staff meetings meant exactly what they said. On this basis, we have proceeded to develop the legal techniques for this all-out attack on segregation. . . .[W]e propose to file these cases on the theory that facilities are unequal and to request an injunction by the court to enjoin the maintenance of the policy of discrimination. This will bring about either equal facilities or the breaking down of segregation. All of 29. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to office (April 8, 1946) [VOL. 40 this was explained in the memorandum on policy, which concludes with the following . . . paragraph... : Finally it must be pointed out that because of the reasons set out above, the N.A.A.C.P. cannot take part in any legal proceeding which seeks to enforce segregation statutes, which condones segregation in public schools, or which admits the validity of these statutes.
You will note from this procedure that the real difference is that we do not any any place admit the validity of segregation statutes and we do not call for the enforcement of these illegal statutes.
* ' .I am beginning to doubt that our branch officers are fully indoctrinated on the policy of the NAACP in being opposed to segregation. It is therefore obvious that we need to educate our branch officers and in turn the membership, and finally, the people in the need for complete support in this "all-out attack on segregation because it will be impossible for our branch officers to do a good job unless we first sell them.
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The Board of Directors and the Annual Conference of the NAACP endorsed Marshall's position in 1948. The Board stated, "it is our policy that the N.A.A.C.P. will not undertake any case or cooperate in any case which recognizes or purports to recognize the validity of segregation statutes or ordinances; the N.A.A.C.P. will likewise not participate in any case which has as its direct purpose the establishment of segregated public facilities., 33 The Conference "urge[d] the National Office and the Branches to engage in a campaign to remove narrow thinking within the ranks and eliminate any internal opposition to the elimination of segregation." governmental enforced segregation declared invalid ... 36 The lawyers agreed that the cases should seek injunctions against discrimination and admission of blacks to white schools. They recommended that the cases "in each instance should make a direct challenge of the segregation statutes involved.
7
The staff had thus become committed to the direct attack rather quickly. But no action followed from that commitment; the lawyers rejected equalization as a remedy the NAACP should seek, but accepted the practical equivalent of a "leave it to the defendants" relief in cases that were actually filed. 38 This would of course eliminate the pressures from those who feared a direct attack. But it left the staff vulnerable to attacks from two other directions. Those who like Carter Wesley positively preferred equalization litigation saw nothing happening. To them Marshall offered Robinson's exploratory survey as a reason for the staff's failure to act. First the survey had to be completed, and its results then showed how expensive the strategy would be. The other source of pressure was the constituency that desired an immediate direct attack. Marshall's letter to Carl Murphy gave one response, but far more common were references to the pending university cases in Texas and Oklahoma. For example, the Topeka branch of the NAACP expressed interest in 1948 in starting a direct attack on segregation there, believing that the schools were "physically substantially equal.
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Marian Wynn Perry replied that the national staff would not handle the case until the university cases reached the Supreme Court, "presenting a picture from which it could be argued that inequality inevitably results from segregation., 4 ' The most elaborate explanation was given to the President of the North Carolina State Conference of Branches by Edward Dudley:
[I]t is my impression that we would not be able to undertake any additional university cases from this office until such time as some of those presently pending are finally determined. I am sure you realize that we must eventually reach the Supreme Court of the United States on the question of segregation per se before we can hope to fully break down this type of discrimination. One case can do it, or even two, and, therefore, we do not feel that a large number of cases should be taken to the Supreme Court at this time, primarily because it is both financially and physically impossible for this office to supervise these cases in all stages of appeal properly. In spite of this, if the State Conference, through its Legal Committee, desires to go forward with a case of its own in the lower courts, particularly in jurisdictions wherein no facilities are available for Negroes, we have no objections and if the attorneys will cooperate with this office by sending us a draft of their pleadings before they are filed and other papers, we will be very happy to check over same and advise them in accordance with procedures being used throughout the country in similar cases. As you know, our ultimate objective is to break down segregation as we feel that there can be no equality in a segregated set-up. We are, therefore, pitching our fight primarily on this issue. If the Supreme Court of the United States, when our cases arrive there, is unable to agree with us at this time, we can then fall back and rely upon the "separate but equal" theory and file as many suits as we are financially able to do so seeking to equalize every single facility offered to the public by virtue of state monies. As stated above, this does not close the door to action by the State Conference in continuous cooperation with this office but it does suggest that when certain cases are lost in the lower courts we may not be able to take them up on appeal because of the number of cases presently pending and the further fact that it only takes one good case to set a precedent.
4
Marshall and the staff had thus bought time, during which they could work out the the problems associated with the direct attack strategy that they wanted to pursue, and persuade their constituency that the course the staff preferred was the correct one to follow. They were also able to take advantage of changes in the political climate between 1945 and 1950. Blacks, North and South, formed an important part of the New Deal coalition that was falling apart after the war. Liberal Democrats, and Harry Truman, needed to solidify the support of the black community. Truman established a Committee on Civil Rights, whose 1947 report To Secure These Rights forthrightly called for "the elimination of segregation . . . from American life." International policy joined with domestic politics in the new atmosphere. In addition to moral and economic reasons for eliminating discrimination, the Committee gave an "international reason." Discrimination was "a serious obstacle" to making the country "an enormous, positive influence for peace and progress throughout the world." Those with competing philosophies have stressed -and shamelessly distorted -our shortcomings. . . . They have tried to prove our democracy an empty fraud, and our nation a consistent oppressor of underprivileged people . . . . The United States is not so strong, the final triumph of the democratic ideal is not so inevitable that we can ignore what the world thinks of us or our record.
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Shortly after To Secure These Rights was issued, Truman's AttorneyGeneral Tom Clark decided to file a brief supporting the NAACP's position in cases then pending that challenged judicial enforcement of racially restrictive housing covenants. 43 Opponents of the direct attack had been able to couple the fear of mass firings with a sense that the direct attack was unlikely to succeed. By reducing the risk of failure, these changes in the general political climate strengthened the position of Marshall and the staff. The direct attack strategy, they could now say, was not only right, it was likely to succeed. The brief of the United States in the restrictive covenant cases had another significant facet. Its legal argument was prefaced by a detailed analysis of the implications of restrictive covenants as a matter of public policy. While the policy analysis formally functioned to provide the reasons for the government's participation in a lawsuit between private parties, 4 " it also signalled the impact of Legal Realism on the process of constitutional decision-making. One strand in the Realist movement in the 1930's emphasized the importance for legal decisions of understanding the actual operation of legal rules, and of selecting rules on the basis of the social policies they promoted. 45 Howard Law School had been in one sense a center for Realist thinking, but it existed outside the intellectual core of academic law. During the New Deal, Realism became a major intellectual movement in law. Recent graduates of law schools brought to the post-war NAACP and Department of Justice the conviction that the constitutional argument against segregation could be keyed to facts and policy. Though analytical distinctions could be drawn between, on the one hand, factual and policy analysis to inform legislative choice or to uphold legislation as constitutional, and, on the other, similar arguments to support a decision finding a practice unconstitutional, intellectual currents do not always follow the lines 42. President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights (Washington, 1947 ) at 166, 146-48. 43. See Kellogg, Civil Rights Consciousness in the 1940s, 42 TiIE HISTORIAN 19 (1979 ; R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 253 (1975 that rational analysis would lay down. What came to be called the sociological argument against segregation gained at least some of its force as a legacy of Realism.
The NAACP had its first opportunity to use the sociological argument in 1946. Mexican-American parents in Orange County, California, had filed a lawsuit in March 1945, challenging the local practice of segregating their children from those of whites. Neither they nor their attorneys informed the NAACP of the original proceedings. Although the NAACP "did not anticipate" the case, when the staff learned of it they understood the opportunities it gave them. The trial judge found the practice unconstitutional, and the school boards appealed. The NAACP and other organizations filed briefs supporting the parents. The NAACP relied heavily on the sociological argument, drawing on published material detailing the harms caused by segregation per se. William Hastie, still serving as a counsellor to Marshall, read the brief and wrote him that the argument must be developed "fully with as little delay as possible. . . . The point is clearly developed, but I believe we will be able to sustain it only when we make an exhaustive investigation." He suggested using "people in the field of education" to "assembl[e] and organiz[e] practically the entire body of available material." He closed by noting that "there may come some other case sooner than we anticipate in which we will have to make a decisive fight upon this issue., 46 Because the NAACP was not a party to the California case, it Was able to experiment with the sociological argument at no cost whatever. Though the appeals court agreed that the practices were unconstitutional, it neither adopted nor rejected the sociological argument. The NAACP staff thus began to put the argument into shape, suffered no defeat with implications for its own cases, and expressed its commitment to the direct attack without threatening its own constituency in the South.
As Hastie guessed, the sociological argument had to be put to work sooner than Marshall expected. In early 1946 the NAACP prepared to bring cases seeking the admission of black students to the state law schools in Oklahoma and Texas, where no law schools for blacks had been established. The authorities in Oklahoma were sufficiently antediluvian that though the NAACP won its first education case in the Supreme Court since Gaines, nothing came of the victory. The Texas authorities, though, were surprisingly agile, and their maneuvers forced Marshall to work out the details of the sociological argument under some pressure. 1855-1975, 108-35 (1976) .
From the beginning Marshall believed that he could have won the Oklahoma case "in Mississippi.
'' 4 7 Ada Lois Sipuel, the plaintiff, was a strong-willed young woman who, though married, continued to use her own name through most of the litigation. The case was attended at the start with the usual delays, but the suit was filed in April 1946. In July the state trial court dismissed the action, holding that a plaintiff could not use mandamus to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, Sipuel appealed, and one year after the lawsuit started, the state Supreme Court affirmed the decision. It discovered some ambiguities in the NAACP's complaint, briefs, and oral arguments, which led it to conclude that Sipuel did not clearly seek admission to the white law school but might be satisfied if the state established a separate but equal black school. However, the court said, a demand on the state was required before it was compelled to set up a black school. Although the NAACP sought review in the Supreme Court, Marshall was not entirely happy when the Court agreed to hear the case. Because the case had been disposed of without any evidence having been heard, the record was so thin that a reversal of the state courts might simply but, Marshall feared, openly reaffirm the "separate but equal" doctrine. 4 ' He therefore took care to mount a direct attack on Plessy in his brief to the Supreme Court; the Court might then treat the case as a simple one but be scared away from relying directly on or reaffirming the "separate but equal" rule. On January 12, 1948, four days after argument, the Supreme Court reversed the state courts. 49 Its opinion consisted of three paragraphs, and relied exclusively on Gaines. The NAACP's lawyers thought it significant, though, that the court had decided the case so quickly and had directed that its mandate, the document directing the lower courts to act on the case, issue forthwith. Registration at the white law school was scheduled for January 29, and the lawyers assumed that the Court wanted Sipuel admitted. However, the state Supreme Court, in an opinion issued on January 17, took the escape route that Gaines seemed to permit, and directed the university authorities to open a "substantially equal" black law school. Because of the Court's mandate, it seemed to the NAACP lawyers that the black school had to open by January 29 too. That was manifestly impossible, which meant, the lawyers decided, that the state Supreme Court had blatantly defied the United States Supreme Court. 47 . See generally Roscoe Dunjee to Marshall (Jan. 15, 1946) S. 631 (1948) . The procedural history is taken from the record.
Invoking the standard but rarely-employed procedure for challenging directing evasions of the Court's mandates, they therefore filed a motion for permission to file a petition for an order directing the Oklahoma courts to comply with the original decision by ordering Sipuel's admission to the white law school.
5° But Marshall's earlier strategy now turned back on him. The Court was unwilling to face challenges to the "separate but equal" doctrine. It could avoid the issue if Sipuel had in fact indicated her willingness to attend a separate school, for then the issue of substantial equality would properly be explored by the state trial court. Over two dissents, the Court rejected the NAACP's motion on the ground that Marshall had not attacked "separate but equal" in the state court nor, the opinion said, was that "an issue here" as the case was submitted to it. 5 1 Oklahoma did open a law school for blacks, and a trial on substantial equality was held later in 1948. In the eighteen months the black school operated, one student attended. Sipuel was admitted to the previously white school in August 1949.
Meanwhile the Texas law school case had moved to the center of the NAACP's attention. At the end of January 1946, local NAACP officials had located Heman Sweatt, a letter carrier who wanted to attend law school.
5 2 Although Sweatt had been graduated from an unaccredited school, Marshall decided that it was worth proceeding on the chance that the authorities would deny Sweatt's application on the ground of race rather than qualifications. 5 3 Theophilus Painter, the President of the University of Texas, did just that, 5 4 and the lawsuit was filed in May, one month after Sipuel's case had been filed.
The development of the NAACP's litigation strategy in Sweatt v. Painter can be understood only in light of the complex procedural history of the case. 55 Painter's letter denying admission to the white law school in Austin informed Sweatt that he could demand that a black law school be established. 56 The trial judge agreed. Although he held that the existing situation, in which blacks had no separate law school and 50. Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147 (1948) . See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 245 (5th ed. 1978) . Court, 1948 -1955 , 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 7-9 (1979 The NAACP had six weeks to prepare for the trial. This time constraint and the new factual posture of the case affected Marshall's strategic decisions. At the outset the case seemed almost as straightforward as Sipuel's, and even the creation of the Houston makeshift school injected only a simple element of proving the obvious physical inequality between the black and white schools. The move to Austin complicated the factual case and provided a real opportunity to use the case for the broader purpose of attacking "separate but equal." Conceptually, there were two stages in the NAACP's decisions. First, Marshall had to decide how much to focus on the physical aspects of inequality. As he developed the record, an honest but, fairly speaking, rather weak case of physical inequality could be presented. The black school was small, but on a per capita basis it provided equivalent floor space to that given in the white school. Of course, the comparisons were [VOL. 40 based on the assumption that ten blacks would enroll, and because of deep opposition in the black community to the state's strategy, only one black actually enrolled. 6 2 But that could hardly be attributed to the state's failure to provide adequate physical facilities. The state law library was not designed to accommodate use by students, but it had essentially the same contents as the library at the white school. The instructors in the black school did not teach full-time there, but they were not part-time teachers. The undeniable differences between the schools lay in their extracurricular, intangible aspects. These included the absence of a law review and a moot court program at the black school, and the inability of a school with a projected enrollment of ten to support such activities. But once the attention shifted from physical facilities and the formal program, it was easy to broaden the argument to include all sorts of non-curricular differences between the schools: reputation, opportunity for developing professional contacts, and so on. And once those differences became relevant, the sociological argument could be deployed fully. Thus, the manner in which Sweatt developed made it seem easy and indeed perhaps necessary to attack Plessy. The flaws the Court had found in the attempt to do so in Sipuel were eliminated because Sweatt was in some ways a harder case, in which all relevant arguments seemed appropriate and possibly essential.
See Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decision-Making in the Supreme
The second stage in Sweatt followed almost inexorably once the case had been broadened. If "separate but equal" was to be attacked using the sociological argument, it made sense to attack it across the board, not just for law schools or graduate education. Here the points about reputation and professional contacts would serve only as specific examples of the general harms that segregation imposed. Thus, Marshall's approach in Sweatt would give the Supreme Court a choice. It could follow the physical inequality route, for which there was some evidence. If it did so, the NAACP would have lost nothing and gained a little. But if the Court faced the record more honestly, and wanted to rule in Sweatt's favor, it would have to recognize the significance of the intangible aspects of education. Having done so, Marshall hoped, the Court would be committed to moving further down the path that the sociological argument provided.
But six weeks was an extremely short period in which to develop all this. Marshall was not entirely happy about the prospects of a "wide open" trial, although he understood the opportunity he was given. On So, whether we want it or not, we are now faced with the proposition of going into the question of segregation as such. I think we should do so because even if we don't take the case far, we at least should experiment on the type of evidence which we may be able to produce on this question. For example, we want to produce experts such as Charlie Thompson to testify as to the inevitable effects of segregation in per capita expenditures, etc. We are also contemplating putting up Otto Kleinberg to testify as to the racial characteristics not being present and other evils of segregation. We are also contemplating putting on anthropologists to show that there is no difference between folks.
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Hastie urged Marshall to be cautious. He apparently believed that the issue of substantial equality would turn on physical and curricular matters, where the NAACP's case was weakest:
While evidence on the consequences of segregation is made as comprehensive as possible, I think it should lead to the narrower point that at the graduate and professional level limited demand for training and high per capita cost make discrimination in fact inevitable. Certainly we cannot argue that segregation at the lower levels is permissible. We should, however, give the court a basis for distinguishing the general public school situation from the case at hand. In that way at least an infinitesimal chance of winning the law suit can be preserved.'
He also agreed that the NAACP might not take Sweatt to the Supreme Court, but noted that "public pressure to carry the case as far as possible will be tremendous. You might warn NAACP speakers against uncautious predictions of what will be done in this litigation. ' "65 But, consistent with his preference for the direct attack on segregation, Marshall's enthusiasm was not to be dampened. After the 1948 trial on substantial equality in Sipuel, for example, he wrote Erwin Griswold, Dean of Harvard Law School and a witness for the NAACP at that trial, "Frankly, I am seriously worried that the Judge will go off on the point of physical inequality and will completely dodge the segregation issue. 6 6 Griswold replied, "Of course I understand your great desire to carry on the legal battle and to win a complete victory in very short order." 6 But, Griswold said, Sipuel was a good case on inequality and a bad one on segregation, and he hoped that the judge would indeed do what Marshall feared. "The thing to do with this case, as I see it, is to win it. That will be a very great step forward. It will, indeed, be one of the most important steps yet taken on the segregation problem." 6 " The time limitations in Sweatt led Marshall to pursue a dual strategy. Because it was a law school case, he relied on experts in legal education to testify in court about what substantial equality would be and how it could not be reached in separate schools. The more general points were made by presenting one witness, Robert Redfield, an anthropologist, and by invoking social science research like Gunnar Myrdal's American Dilemma, surveys published in the Journal of Negro Education, and the Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights. This made it possible to press the specifics on the court through direct testimony and, perhaps more important, to coordinate the presentation of the sociological argument in the limited time available.
The strategy succeeded, not in the Texas courts, which unsurprisingly rejected Sweatt's claim, but in the United States Supreme Court. Sweatt was accompanied by two other cases. In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, a sixty-eight year old black educator seeking a doctorate was admitted to the program at the white university but was required to sit in a roped-off part of the classrooms and at special tables in the library and cafeteria. But the opinions laid the ground for future developments, of which the Justices were acutely conscious. In describing the inequalities in Sweatt the Court's opinion listed both the physical aspects and the intangibles on which Clark and the NAACP had so heavily relied. Given the discussions within the Court, invoking the intangibles committed the Justices as much as any doctrine can to the position that equality could not be achieved in separate graduate and professional schools. And recognition of the relevance of intangibles opened the way to adoption of the sociological argument. Judges concerned about precedent could have drawn distinctions had they wanted to, but as the nine men who made the decisions grappled with Sweatt and McLaurin, they became convinced as individuals that, once they decided or were 71. For all the details, see Hutchinson, supra note 51.
[VOL. 40 forced to face the issue, they would overrule Plessy. As Clark had concluded in his memorandum, "If some say this undermines Plessy then let it fall, as have many Nineteenth Century oracles."
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Marshall had lived with the attack on segregated education all his professional life. When he read the opinions in Sweatt and McLaurin he understood what the Justices had done when they chose to rely on intangibles. One week after the decisions were announced, he wrote one of his law school expert witnesses, "All three of the decisions [including Henderson] are replete with road markings telling us where to go next." 7 3 He believed that the law had reached a turn in the road. But though the decision turned out to be relatively painless, it was not inevitable that the NAACP would follow the logic of the Court's opinions to the direct attack. Sweatt and McLaurin did not affect the prospective costs and gains to the organization in any obvious way.
Having pursued the cases and having won on extraordinarily farreaching grounds, the NAACP might have been embarrassed had it gone back to an equalization approach in elementary and secondary education. Yet the increased prospects for success in a direct attack also signalled increased threats to black teachers. In cost-benefit terms Sweatt and McLaurin ought not to have affected the calculus greatly. But it is important to remember that the staff had always preferred the direct attack. The strategy of temporizing mattered for two reasons. Again to use the terms of cost-benefit analysis, an organization's expected gains and losses from a decision must be estimated before the decision is made. Delaying a decision may improve the ability to make an accurate estimate, as more resources are invested in the process of estimation. Marshall had spent five years educating his constituency on the issues of equalization versus direct attack, and almost certainly made the membership more aware of exactly what was at stake. When, at the end, Sweatt and McLaurin were decided, the staff could also use the increased likelihood of success as a method of focusing attention on a careful assessment of costs and benefits. In 1945 uncertainties in the evaluation of costs and benefits made it unclear to the NAACP's membership that the direct attack promised a positive payoff; in 1950 greater precision developed in the interim showed that the payoff would be positive. The direct attack had crossed a threshold because of the time spent in educating the NAACP's membership. Marshall preferred the direct attack from the start. But he put off the decision from a time when it would have seriously split the NAACP to a time when the external environment, in politics and legal doctrine, and the internal politics of the organization made it easier for others to agree that what Marshall wanted was in their interest too. During this phase of the campaign against school segregation, Marshall's various skills as a lawyer were employed to great effect. His judgment enabled the NAACP to develop the sociological argument in appropriate contexts, and it informed his understanding of the meaning of the way in which the opinions in Sweatt and McLaurin were written. But in my view Marshall's greatest skill was political: by strategies of delay ranging from the commission to Spottswood Robinson to the reference to the pending university cases, he was able to reconcile internal differences among his and the NAACP's diverse constituencies. By 1950 the decision to attack segregation in elementary and secondary schools directly, which five years earlier would have been controversial and divisive, was, from the constituencies' point of view, inevitable and unifying. It is hard to identify anyone in the NAACP during that period other than Thurgood Marshall who chould have pulled it off. 
